

1918—



—1947

Entered as 2nd class matter

MR. PAUL F. MANLEY  
17917 SCHNELEY AVE.  
CLEVELAND 19, OHIO

CLM-1

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXVII, No. 3

OCTOBER 31, 1947

## DE GAULLE'S SUCCESS FAILS TO DISCOURAGE FRENCH SOCIALISTS

THE French municipal elections of October 19 and 26 have been closely watched for indications of the attitude of a pre-eminently articulate people toward the two major related issues of our times—the issue of democracy versus totalitarianism, and the issue of the United States versus Russia. These elections, the first of which were held in communities of over 9,000, the second in communities of less than 9,000, revealed four striking trends.

First, a variety of political parties ranging from the right-of-center Radical Socialists led by the veteran Edouard Herriot to extremist Rightists, and even Vichyites, rallied behind General de Gaulle in an anti-Communist *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (Reunion of the French People) and polled close to 40 per cent of the total vote. Second, the Communists, who on the eve of the elections appeared to have reached the high-water mark of their influence, made no additional gains even in industrial centers regarded as Communist strongholds, and registered some losses in the smaller communities. Third, the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (Popular Republican Movement) led by Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, which since May has shared power with the Socialists in the cabinet of Premier Ramadier, lost many of its supporters to General de Gaulle's RPF, and was reduced from the position of second largest party in terms of votes gained in 1946 (the Communists then being first) to a poor fourth, trailing the Socialists. Fourth, the Socialists on the whole held fast to the gains they had made after the war, and in the smaller communities won votes at the expense of the Communists. Today the Socialists occupy the strategic, if extremely onerous position, of a middle-of-the-road group between extreme Right and extreme Left. It should be noted that

these elections represent current sentiments only in cities and towns, traditionally inclined to the Left—not in the countryside, where the votes of the traditionally conservative peasants may well reveal a far more marked trend against communism.

WHAT ARE DE GAULLE'S OBJECTIVES? The striking success won at the polls by the various groups General de Gaulle had rallied under the banner of anti-communism is less a tribute to him personally than the expression of popular revulsion against the political conflicts and tensions that have marred France's otherwise notable recovery from the effects of war and occupation. It is too early to say whether the disparate elements composing the RPF, while united *against* communism, can act *for* a common program; nor has the General given any comprehensive view of the program he wants his followers to support. What he has made clear is that he will not assume governmental responsibility unless the executive has been legally vested with sufficient authority to deal with any emergency—the emergency he immediately anticipates being an attempt on the part of the Communists, excluded from the cabinet since May, to seize power either by a *coup d'état* or by resort to a general strike. The General has called on Premier Ramadier to recognize the situation created by the municipal elections, submit his resignation and that of his cabinet, and clear the way for dissolution of the National Assembly and election of a new Assembly which could amend the 1946 constitution.

WILL COMMUNISTS STAGE COUP? The Communists, at the other end of France's political spectrum, also face a series of problems. During the war and in the immediate post-war period the Communist party won a large number of sympa-

*Contents of this BULLETIN may be reprinted with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.*

thizers among groups which had previously been closed to it, including peasants, by making often contradictory promises to all, in the hope of obtaining sufficient support to continue in a coalition cabinet, and ultimately control the government. Once the Communists were excluded from the cabinet by Premier Ramadier, they could neither fulfill their promises, nor hope to achieve political power by peaceful means, at least in the visible future. Yet should the Communists resort to force, they would automatically alienate their newly acquired sympathizers, who while desiring social and economic reform, are in no mood for revolution. The Communist party in France—and this, in varying measure, is true of other European countries—is confronted with the choice of either trying to seize power now, at the risk of being defeated and discredited, or whittling down its ranks to a hard revolutionary core, and waiting for a more propitious opportunity.

**ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO SOCIALISTS.** In this complex political situation, the Socialists, who are attempting to combine social and economic reform with determination to preserve political liberties, are in a position to play a key role. In number of votes the Socialists rank third after the *Rassemblement* and the Communists, and cannot expect to govern alone. They are therefore faced with the alternatives of either cooperating with the *Rassemblement*, or the Communists—or else gaining sufficient support from smaller uncommitted political groups to form a viable government. General de Gaulle has indicated that he is willing to welcome the Socialists into the *Rassemblement*, provided they repudiate once and for all any intention of collaborating with the Communists. He is also reported to

recognize that no return to what we here call a “free economy” is possible in France. It has been suggested that the Socialists, if they join the *Rassemblement*, might form a new Center in combination with the less Rightist elements of the RPF, which might stabilize the fluctuating political situation in France. The executive committee of the Socialist party, however, indicated opposition to this course on October 27, when it declared that de Gaulle’s intentions were in the “pure tradition of Bonapartism and Boulangism.” Meanwhile, the Socialists are themselves divided between right-wing elements headed by Léon Blum, and left-wing elements which have been flirting with the Communists; and in the municipal councils, the Communists on a number of occasions gave their support to Socialist candidates. The Communists have already urged the Socialists to form a new Popular Front against the de Gaulle forces, and doubtless hope to win over at least the left-wing Socialists. That this strategy has succeeded is indicated by recent developments in Poland, where left-wing Socialists and left-wing members of Mikolajczyk’s Peasant party are working closely with the Communists.

What Premier Ramadier apparently would prefer to do is to attempt the formation of a Socialist-led government which would include representatives of other groups that reject both de Gaullism and communism. In this he would probably have the support of the much reduced MRP, which has decided to read out of the party all who join de Gaulle. The coming days will prove a historic test of the capacity of Socialists of various inspirations to govern France.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## **BREAK WITH RUSSIA DUE TO HOME PROBLEMS IN CHILE AND BRAZIL**

The abrupt severance of diplomatic relations with Russia by the Brazilian and Chilean governments on October 21 and their rigid suppression of local Communist movements illustrate the extent to which the Latin American nations have been unwillingly caught up in the ideological conflict of our times. Internal and external pressures alike have prevented them from steering the independent course of national policy they had hoped to develop when the war ended. A substantial exchange of products between Latin America and Russia has failed to materialize. Material benefits, on the other hand, might be expected from the United States in exchange for a firm anti-Communist stand—for so Latin Americans have interpreted the Marshall plan. At the same time Latin American governments have been harassed by local Communist minorities constantly encouraged by the deteriorating economic situation.

**REPRESSIVE MEASURES IN BRAZIL.** Brazil’s break with Russia terminates a period of strained

relations punctuated by governmental attacks on the Brazilian Communist party and counterattacks on the Rio de Janeiro government by the Soviet press. In the December 1945 elections to determine Vargas’ successor, the Communist party polled 600,000 votes, approximately 10 per cent of the total ballot, although the Communist organization claimed only 180,000 members. In the state and municipal elections a year later, the party, while not meeting its pre-election forecast, obtained nearly 800,000 votes. At the time the large Communist vote was explained as a popular (and not necessarily Communist) protest against soaring prices, outrageous speculation by black marketeers with influential connections, and extreme shortages even of those foodstuffs which Brazil is able to produce in abundance.

In the spring of 1947 the government initiated a program of rigorous suppression of the Communist movement. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal outlawed the Communist party as the agent of a

foreign government. At the same time the Dutra government suspended the Confederation of Brazilian Workers for six months until its affiliated unions could be purged of Communist influence. Although liberal public opinion was generally distressed by these measures, the Supreme Court upheld the Electoral Tribunal's decision.

A campaign of retaliation in the Russian press against the Brazilian government furnished the immediate occasion for handing the Soviet Embassy staff their passports. In analyzing Brazilian official policy, *Izvestia* described it as subservient to the wishes of the United States and attacked General Dutra personally as a Fascist who had been decorated by Hitler before the war. After two Brazilian notes demanding an explanation and a retraction were ignored, the Rio government on October 21 announced the rupture. In the comparable case of a Soviet press attack on President Truman, the United States limited itself to a demand for an apology.

**CHILEAN ACTION.** Meanwhile the Chilean government has met an economic and political situation similar in many respects to that prevailing in Brazil with almost identical measures. Since 1938 the Chilean Communist party had been a member of the loose and uneasy coalition of political parties comprising the government. In the national elections of 1946 the moderate Radical party candidate, Senator Gabriel González Videla counted heavily on the 50,000 Communist votes to swing the victory, and after his election rewarded the party with three cabinet posts. The new government, however, was unable to relieve an inflationary crisis as desperate as that in Brazil, and the Communists came in for their full, possibly undue, share of blame for the failure. In April 1947 the cabinet was reorganized to exclude the Communists who then went into opposition.

Early in October a strike of about 17,000 workers in the southern coal mines, which produce most of Chile's annual output of 2,400,000 tons, aroused the government to stern action. In mediating, the government had offered certain increases to the miners, whose average minimum wage was said to be approximately \$1.20 a day, but the unions had refused the offer. On October 8 the entire area was

placed under military law, army reservists were sent in to work the mines, and Communist municipal officials and labor leaders were deported to the far South. A day later the government issued a statement accusing the Chilean Communist party in this instance of carrying out instructions emanating from Communist international headquarters in Belgrade through a regional organization located in Argentina. The chargé d'affaires of the Yugoslav legation in Santiago and an official of the Yugoslav legation in Buenos Aires were allegedly implicated in the plot to sabotage production in this and other raw-material-producing industries of vital importance to hemisphere defense. Following their expulsion, the Yugoslav government broke relations with Chile, and Chile, in turn, severed connections with the Russian and Czechoslovak governments on October 21. Meanwhile, as the coal miners went back to work, the nitrate and copper producing provinces were declared emergency zones, the headquarters of Communist unions were occupied and their leaders imprisoned, government officials suspected of Communist affiliation were removed from their posts, and party publications were closed.

That Chile and Brazil have undoubtedly acted in concert and after consultation raises the question whether the Argentine government will take similar steps and whether, indeed, the solid Latin American front against communism that President González has proposed will be formed. Argentina, as the most prosperous of Latin American states, is in a stronger position than its neighbors to pursue the "middle course" which President Perón proclaimed as his policy. And Perón, as a nationalist leader, could gain nothing but might lose prestige at home and bargaining power abroad by irrevocably aligning himself with the United States. It is possible, however, that the Communist question in all its ramifications will be raised at the ninth Pan American Conference at Bogotá in January 1948. In that case, the United States, which bears the major share of responsibility for hemisphere decisions, will, in conjunction with its Latin American neighbors, be confronted by the necessity for evolving a solution that will relieve, rather than repress, economic and social tensions.

OLIVE HOLMES

## NANKING HARASSED BY INCREASING INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES

The record of American policy in China during recent years is one of almost constant frustration. The "Stilwell incident" of 1944, Ambassador Hurley's resignation a year later, the breakdown of General Marshall's mediation effort in 1946, and current differences in Washington over the Wedemeyer report all symbolize a largely unsuccessful attempt to influence Chinese developments.

**IS CHINA LIKE GREECE?** Since the announce-

ment of the Truman Doctrine last March some advocates of assistance to Nanking have urged that the United States act in China as in Greece, giving extensive aid under careful supervision. One fact overlooked in such proposals is that any foreign move which has an important effect in prolonging and intensifying the civil war will be deeply resented by many millions of Chinese. At the same time any effort to supervise Chinese affairs would arouse



against us a spirit of nationalism ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left—this despite the fact that some circles in Nanking are willing to accept controls as the price of further aid.

Greece, moreover, has less than 8,000,000 people, China an estimated 450,000,000. Compared with China Greece is a pin point on the earth's surface. In addition, since V-J Day the United States has already spent large sums in China, and there is no evidence that the imposition of conditions could alter the Chinese picture decisively at this date. Comparisons with other countries are therefore likely to confuse rather than clarify our problems in China.

**NANKING'S MILITARY CRISIS.** Even a brief survey of recent developments indicates how perilous Nanking's position has become. In Manchuria the remaining fragment of Central government territory is being shattered in more and more places, and the isolation of the Nanking-held cities is growing. In the past month Central armies in this region are reported to have lost 50,000 men (mostly through surrender or desertion), four times as many as the Communists have lost. In Shantung province, jutting out into the Yellow Sea some distance south of Manchuria, Nanking's troops have taken Chefoo and Weihaiwei, two Communist seaports. But the Shantung countryside is to a great extent under the Communists, and to the north, in Hopei province, Nanking reported the loss of three divisions in October.

One major development since mid-summer has been the southward movement of Communist forces, notably those under General Liu Po-cheng. New Communist areas are being created between the Yellow River and the Yangtze in a region from which Nanking long ago withdrew many troops for the civil war in the North. As a result, the heart of Kuomintang territory in Central China is more exposed than before, and the Communists are taking advantage of their improved position to disrupt communications. Almost everywhere the Central government is on the defensive, with the prospect, as time goes on, of being pinned down more and more to a coastal position, while the Communists and allied forces spread through the vast interior.

**WEAKNESS AND REPRESSION.** The nature of some of these actual or potential allies of the Communists is suggested by Nanking's weakness at its territorial fringes in South and North China. Kwangtung, a major southern province in which Canton is located, is displaying a marked separatist tendency. One feature of the situation is the participation of Kwangtung officials in widespread

smuggling between Hong Kong and the China coast, resulting in a heavy loss of revenue for Nanking. Another is the existence of a guerrilla movement, as yet weak and heterogeneous, linked with General Li Chi-shen, a Kuomintang veteran now in Hong Kong, who advocates internal peace and a coalition government with liberals and Communists.

In Peiping military secret police recently arrested various persons in government ranks on the charge of seeking to overturn the regime for the purpose of achieving such a coalition. Those seized included subordinates of two top generals, Sun Lien-chung (Governor of Hopei and head of Nanking's troops in that province) and Li Tsung-jen (commander of Nanking's North China headquarters). Some were old associates of Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian general" now in the United States, who is sharply critical of Nanking's policies and urges democratic unity and the cessation of the civil war. These developments suggest the growth of a peace movement in non-Communist military circles.

As Nanking's position weakens, it is resorting increasingly to force in its relations with prominent peace advocates in its own territory. One person arrested in Peiping was Yu Hsing-ching, a leading Christian who was interviewed by General Wedemeyer this past summer. In Sian, major city of the Northwest, twenty members of the Democratic League were executed early in October. The League, an organization of liberals and Leftists whose representatives participated in General Marshall's negotiations, has drawn significant support from Chinese intellectual and business circles. On October 28 Nanking announced that the Democratic League had been outlawed.

Nanking's declining fortunes in war and politics are closely linked with economic problems. Recently the Chinese dollar has fallen to the unprecedented level of between eighty and ninety thousand to one American dollar. This has been caused in part by the flight of capital from war-torn Manchuria and North China to Shanghai. Commodity prices have moved upward at an alarming rate, and labor unrest in Shanghai is said to be increasing.

These developments all suggest that further American aid could hardly constitute more than a delaying action. Like a local anaesthetic, the injection of American arms and dollars would ease the Central government's position temporarily, but when the effects wore off larger doses would be necessary.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

*(The second in a series of articles on American policy in China.)*

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXVII, No. 3, OCTOBER 31, 1947. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMBURY, *President*; HELEN M. DAGGETT, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

**F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Six Dollars a Year**  
*Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.*